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[Redacted] 23 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Scheduling of NIE 11-4-60

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 6.
2. We have taken the matter of the timing of the Soviet papers, especially NIE 11-4-60, off next Wednesday's USIB agenda because some of the agencies wanted to have a preliminary discussion. We have accordingly called a meeting of the USIB representatives to consider the matter on Wednesday, 27 January. This meeting is a follow-up of the brief discussion of the subject at the 14 January USIB meeting which, as you will recall, centered around General Breitweiser's statement that the JCS required NIE 11-4-60 on the first of August 1961. We should like to have your views on the matter before meeting with the representatives.
3. We have no particular concern over the timing; but on the basis of informal checks with USIB representatives and [redacted] we believe that the October-November period permits of fuller use of NIE 11-4 than does the August date.
4. In particular, the October-November date permits the use of NIE 11-4 as up-to-date, agreed intelligence in connection with Congressional briefings, the NATO Standing Group Exercise, the COMUS exercise, the annual review of basic policy which most often begins in January, and the first stages of the annual budget process. In addition, in 1960, the October-November date would be the optimum with respect to providing the new administration an up-to-date appraisal of the USSR.
5. If the USIB accepts this date, there still remains General Breitweiser's problem.

You may recall that he said that the JCS required the general Soviet paper (11-4) in August so that the Chiefs could get on with their budgeting. He spoke as if he were under instructions to press as hard as possible for the early date. He also brought up the question of re-doing the Missile (11-3) and the Long-Range Attack (11-8) papers prior to undertaking the annual review of the general Soviet paper.

6. There is one additional problem related to the Soviet papers that should be considered at this time. It is the review of the military Annexes to II-4 in terms of Khrushchev's recent pronouncements. Specifically, and in the first place, the community should make up its mind as to whether Soviet forces total 3.6 million as per Khrushchev, or 4.2 million, as per NIE II-4-59. In the event we adopt the 3.6 million figure, we should also arrive at an estimate as to how these men are apportioned throughout the Soviet military establishment. In the second place, the community should make up its mind as to whether or not Soviet forces will be reduced over the next year or two by 1.2 million men (as per Khrushchev) and, if they are to be reduced, how these reductions will be allocated throughout the Soviet military establishment. My recommendations with respect to these matters are as follows:

- a. Undertake the review of Soviet force levels as stated in the paragraph above as soon as the evidence begins to accumulate. Aim for the completion of this task by 1 June.
- b. In the event that you and the Board feel that the missile paper (II-5) and the long-range attack paper (II-6) should be reviewed in this calendar year, undertake a simple up-dating of the existing estimates - as opposed to redoing a full-dress job - by 1 July.
- c. In the event that General Bratweiser's principal requirement for August is no more than the military sections of II-4, satisfy this requirement by a simple up-dating of the military Annexes of II-4-59.
- d. Do the annual full-dress job on the general Soviet paper for completion the last week of October-first week of November.

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